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THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS:
A MODEST DISSENT
Allan D. Vestal t
INTRODUCTION
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments is a substantial contribu-
tion to the law. The product of an excellent group of reporters
and advisers, the final draft reflects the years of hard work and
thoughtful consideration that went into it. The new work repre-
sents progress for a number of reasons. First, its use of the terms
"claim preclusion" and "issue preclusion" will help to clarify think-
ing about the impact of decisions.1 Second, the work reflects cur-
rent judicial developments; it is consistent with the Supreme
Court's landmark decisions in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v.
University of Illinois Foundation,2 Montana v. United States,' and Park-
lane Hosiery Co. v. Shore.4 The Restatement Second wisely rejects the
mutuality requirement for issue preclusion,5 and also addresses
the subject of the law of preclusion generally where federal courts
are involved,6 a topic not considered in the first Restatement of
Judgments.7 The Restatement Second has broadened and carefully
delineated the concept of claim preclusion.' These provisions re-
flect an overall willingness to apply preclusive concepts for the
benefit of the courts, the litigants, and society generally. Finally,
with the approval of the Restatement Second, the first Restatement of
Judgments-a voice from the distant past-is no longer signifi-
cant.
t Carver Professor, College of Law, University of Iowa. A.B. 1943, DePauw University;
LL.B. 1949, Yale University.
RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF JUDGMENTS, Introduction ch. 1, at 1 (Tent. Draft No. 7,
1980).
2 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
440 U.S. 147 (1979).
4 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975) [§ 29].
[Throughout this Article, the corresponding section numbers that will appear in the final
Restatement Second are given after citation to the tentative drafts. The final draft was not
available to the author.]
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 134, 135 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980) [§§ 86,
87].
, See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS (1942).
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDCMENTS §§ 61, 61.1 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) [§§ 24,
25].
464
A MODEST DISSENT
Because the law of judgments is dynamic and growing, it is
fair to guess that a Restatement (Third) of Judgments will be as
different from and represent as much of an improvement on the
Restatement Second as does the second Restatement in comparison to
the first. The first Restatement has had a negative influence on the
development of the law, and the Restatement Second's effect on its
future development will probably also be adverse in the years
ahead. This is the nature of the beast; Restatements are only static
statements of a dynamic matter. Law is not rigid; it is changing. We
cannot expect too much from a Restatement. Unfortunately, there
are no editorial boards for the various Restatements as there are
for the Uniform Commercial Code9 and the Uniform Probate
Code.'" If there were, perhaps the Restatements could be kept
current and so become voices of progress, rather than echoes from
the past.
Although the Restatement Second is in most respects a fine
synthesis, certain of its positions seem questionable. Most impor-
tant, the Restatement Second's articulation of issue preclusion is de-
fective in several respects. First, it does not include as a principle
factor the "incentive and opportunity" to litigate. Second, it re-
quires "actual litigation" as a prerequisite to issue preclusion.
Third, it divides the general statement of issue preclusion into
two rules, sections 68" and 88, 12 rather than presenting the mat-
ter in a single coherent statement. It would have been preferable
to provide specifically for the requirement that the party to be
precluded must have had the incentive and opportunity to litigate
the matter, and to delete any reference to actual litigation from
the rule on issue preclusion. Moreover, treatment of issue preclu-
sion should be found in a single place.
The Restatement Second suffers another deficiency in the rigid-
ity of the provisions dealing with nonparties being bound by a
judgment." The Restatement Second does not take note of the de-
veloping nature of the law in this regard. It attempts to place the
9 This editorial board is composed of representatives of the American Law Institute
and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE (U.L.A.), Foreward at ix-xiii (1976).
"0 This editorial board is composed of representatives of the American Bar Association
and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See UNIFORM
PRORATE CODE (U.L.A.), Foreward at iii-vi (1972).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977) [§ 27].
12 Id. § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976) [§ 29].
" See notes 147-82 and accompanying text infra.
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rules dealing with nonparties in precise categories, with no broad
general provisions which might allow for growth. The Restatement
Second is deficient in its coverage of claim preclusion against non-
parties to the first action who hold interests either concurrently
with or subsequent to the party in the first action and who may be
bound by claim preclusion. This area of law is not clearly de-
veloped, yet the Restatement Second does not suggest the possibility
of growth. The Restatement Second alludes to but does not suffi-
ciently discuss the modern tendency to expand issue preclusion to
persons adequately represented in the first action. Finally, issue
preclusion in successive criminal prosecutions is not given any
coverage at all. 4 Although this matter was raised during the
drafting of the Restatement Second, the Reporter and the advisors
wanted to terminate the project; consequently, preclusion in cri-
minal cases was deferred to another day. These matters were
finally deemed "beyond the scope of this Restatement." '5
This Article considers these points and offers another per-
spective in the hope that the Restatement Second will serve not as a
monolithic construct beyond challenge, but rather as a starting
point for critical discussion and positive development in the law of
judgments.
I
THE GENERAL RULE OF ISSUE PRECLUSION
Section 68 [section 27] of the Restatement Second contains the
general rule of issue preclusion:
When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and deter-
mined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is
essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a
subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or
a different claim.' 6
Courts have developed a substantial body of issue preclusion case
law. Examining these judicial developments provides a helpful
context in which to examine the Restatement Second rule.
14 See notes 183-86 and accompanying text infra.
i RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 133, Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980)
[§ 85].
16 Id. § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973) [§ 27].
466 [Vol. 66:464
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A. Incentive and Opportunity to Litigate
A number of courts have articulated rules of issue preclusion
that include such language as the "opportunity to litigate," the
"full opportunity to litigate," or the "full and fair opportunity to
litigate." In addition, some courts have held or stated that issue
preclusion will exist only if the party to be bound had the incen-
tive to litigate, or, in other words, only if a party had involvement
sufficient to guarantee an adequate presentation of its
arguments. 7
'7 See ParkIane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (suggested in referring to
the offensive use of issue preclusion that exceptions might exist and specifically mentioned
situation where stakes were small and future litigation not foreseeable so that the defen-
dant would have had little incentive for vigorous defense); Southern Pac. Transport. Co. v.
Smith Material Corp., 616 F.2d 111, 115 (5th Cir. 1980) (in giving preclusive effect court
noted, "Smith engaged in a week long trial in which several hundred thousand dollars
were at stake; Smith had, therefore, every incentive to litigate Amtrak's negligence, and its
own absence from negligence, to the fullest extent."); Miller Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz
Brewing Co., 605 F.2d 990, 992 (7th Cir. 1979) ("Whether a full and fair opportunity to
litigate was afforded in the other action depends ... upon several factors, including ...
incentive to litigate ... "; court held for issue preclusion); Starker v. United States, 602
F.2d 1341, 1349 (9th Cir. 1979) (in applying issue preclusion against the government,
court noted, "The government had plenty of incentive to litigate Starker I, in which a
$37,342 refund was at stake."); Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 268
(3d Cir. 1978) (in applying issue preclusion court stated, "The plaintiff in Limmer had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the § 14(a) claim in that forum. He had every incentive to
prosecute vigorously the action against the individual defendants"); Winters v. Lavine, 574
F.2d 46, 58 n.14 (2d Cir. 1978) (extensive discussion of "incentive"); Sampson v. Ampex
Corp., 478 F.2d 339, 341 (2d Cir. 1973) (estopped person had "every incentive to litigate
the merits"); Safir v. Gibson, 432 F.2d 137, 143 (2d Cir.) (court found sufficient incentive
in potential liability of $337,000 to apply issue preclusion), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970);
Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (court, rejecting claim of issue
preclusion, stated, "It appears that the plaintiff in Maldonado had a full and fair opportu-
nity to litigate the good faith and independence of the committee. They had every incentive
to prosecute vigorously the issue of bona fides of the committee. Plaintiffs in this action,
however, challenge that incentive through its claim of ineffective representation. Federal
courts will not bind nonparty shareholders in a derivative suit unless their interests were
adequately represented."); Teachers Credit Union v. Homer, 487 F. Supp. 246, 248 (W.D.
Mo. 1980) (in upholding issue preclusion court noted that union "had both the opportu-
nity and the incentive to fully litigate the issues involved"); Mooney v. Fibreboard Corp., 485
F. Supp. 242, 247 (E.D. Tex. 1980) (court considered possibility of unfairness and incen-
tive to litigate and noted, ".... this is not a case where the defendants were sued for small
or nominal damages in the prior action"); Svoboda v. Trane Co., 495 F. Supp. 367, 369
(E.D. Mo. 1979) (plaintiff claimed that issue preclusion did not apply "because he did not
have a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the merits of his claim ... [and] argued
that he lacked the ability and incentive to conduct the litigation in the bankruptcy court";
court considered the argument at length and rejected it); In re Uranium Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1150 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (in holding no issue preclusion court noted
that supposedly precluded party had "no meaningful incentive" on the issue in the first
proceeding); Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc. v. Prometco (Produce & Metals) Co., 470 F.
Supp. 610, 617 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (court held that issue preclusion can be based on a
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The New York Court of Appeals, in Schwartz v. Public
Administrator,8 applied what it regarded as "a modern and stable
statement of the law of res judicata.... [W]here it can be fairly
said that a party has had a full opportunity to litigate a particular
issue, he cannot reasonably demand a second one." 19 The court's
rationale was that a litigant who has had his opportunity-his day
in court-should not be allowed to litigate the same questions
anew. The court's reference to "full" opportunity implies some-
thing more than just an opportunity; it seems to require both the
chance and the motivation to challenge the issues, but not neces-
sarily the actual litigation of the issue. The party risking subse-
quent preclusion has full control in choosing whether to litigate or
concede any particular matter; but it is an informed choice and
one where there is the incentive to litigate."
In Palma v. Powers" the court stated:
[Gionsiderations of public policy become involved where a party
later seeks to litigate a point which he had full opportunity
default judgment, noting that some commentators have criticized this result, generally con-
fining such criticism to the situation where the defaulting party "had little incentive to
defend the prior action or in which the potential for surprise is great. This is hardly such a
case." The court mentioned the $190,000 recovery sought in the prior action); Rust v. First
Nat'l Bank of Pinedale, 466 F. Supp. 135, 140 (D. Wyo. 1979) ("the proper resolution of
the problem depends on whether the party against whom the doctrine of collateral estop-
pel is asserted has a full and fair opportunity and the incentive to vigorously litigate the
identical issue in the earlier proceeding"); United States v. Abatti, 463 F. Supp. 596, 603
(S.D. Calif. 1978) ("At the time of the Tax Court trial, the government had every incentive
to litigate its case fully, both because of the stakes involved there and because it knew that
the criminal trial was 'waiting in the wings.' "); Hann v. Carson, 462 F. Supp. 854, 865
(M.D. Fla. 1978) ("... if the party to be precluded from relitigation in a later case did not
have the initiative and burden of proof in an earlier case, then several other factors are
important to consider. The need and motivation of the party to be precluded in a later
case, to litigate the same questions vigorously in an earlier case, are important. If an earlier
case was one involving de minimus [sic] interests, or having marginal consequences, the
necessity and incentive for full-throttle litigation was probably missing." The court indi-
cated these are factors to be considered in deciding whether preclusion would be unfair.).
18 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969).
19 Id. at 69, 246 N.E.2d at 727-28, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
0 In Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors Ltd., 375 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Mich. 1974),
aff'd, 519 F.2d 119 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975), the court held that issue
preclusion could arise if "the issue has been effectively raised in the prior action" and the
"losing party has had 'a fair opportunity procedurally, substantively, and evidentially' to
contest the issue." Id. at 516 (quoting Eisel v. Columbia Packing Co., 181 F. Supp. 298, 301
(D. Mass. 1960) (footnotes omitted). The court rejected the Restatement Seconds position that
issue preclusion cannot arise from a default judgment. The court stated, "The two-part test
... is far more functional. It ... protects against the abuses of unforeseeability, by includ-
ing such factors as incentive to litigate and choice of forum in the calculus of full and fair
opportunity...." Id. at 516-7. (emphasis added).
"' 295 F. Supp. 924 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
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to litigate previously.... [A] litigant who has once foregone his
opportunity to contest a matter which was necessarily decided
in a previous proceeding should, at least, have the burden of
explaining his failure to controvert the matter in the earlier suit
or his desire to litigate the matter in a second action.22
Again, the key language is "full opportunity to litigate." It turns
not on whether the party actually litigated the issue, but rather
whether the party had the incentive and opportunity to do so. 23
The United States Supreme Court noted the importance of
the incentive to litigate in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore.24  In dis-
cussing the use of offensive collateral estoppel, the Court stated,
"If a defendant in the first action is sued for small or nominal
damages, he may have little incentive to defend vigorously, par-
ticularly if future suits are not foreseeable .... 1 The Court
clearly recognized the importance of the incentive as well as the
opportunity to litigate-notice and time within which to appear-
as prerequisites to the invocation of the doctrine of issue preclu-
sion.
In Montana v. United States,26 the Court stated:
Under collateral estoppel [issue preclusion], once an issue is
actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits
based on a different cause of action involving a party to the
prior litigation.... To preclude parties from contesting matters
that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate pro-
tects their adversaries from the expense and vexation attending
multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters re-
liance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of incon-
sistent decisions.2 7
2 Id. at 936 (footnote omitted).
The incentive to litigate fully in the first action would seem apparent because the
defendants were originally charged with a felony, and this was not reduced to. a misde-
meanor until the start of the trial. Id. at 930. In addition, the defendants, alleged book-
makers, had had telephone service to their premises discontinued by Illinois Bell Tele-
phone Company after the raid by the police. The defendants' attorney, on January 20,
1966 (immediately before the trial), had indicated to the defendants a relationship between
the trial and the right to phone service. Id. at 932.
24 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
2 Id. at 330.
- 440 U.S. 147 (1979).
1 Id. at 153-54.
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The key language here is "full and fair opportunity to litigate."
Under Parklane Hosiery and Montana, it is the opportunity to liti-
gate an issue, and not its actual litigation, that is important.28
The Restatement Second includes an "incentive and opportu-
nity" requirement in a negative cast. Section 68.1(e) [section 25]
provides that relitigation is not precluded if
[t]here is a clear and convincing need for a new determination
of the issue ... because the party sought to be concluded, as a
result of the conduct of his adversary or other special circum-
stances, did not have an adequate opportunity or incentive to
obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial action. 29
Under this articulation, it would seem that a lack of incentive
to litigate fully solely because of the small amount involved would
not be covered. This provision seemingly becomes operative only
if the conduct of the adverse party or some other special cir-
cumstances are somehow involved. However, it should be noted
that in the Comment to clause (e) the unqualified statement is
made, "Or the amount in controversy in the first action may have
been so small in relation to the amount in controversy in the
second that preclusion would be plainly unfair."30 This statement
drops from the rule any reference to "clear and convincing need
for a new determination of the issue."3 It seemingly is saying
that the size of the amount in controversy may alone be enough
to undercut the preclusive effect because of the impact on the
incentive to litigate.
B. Development of the "Actually Litigated" Requirement
Almost from their first meeting, the members of the Advi-
sory Committee to the Restatement Second disagreed about whether
the Restatement Second should recognize that preclusion can exist
21 It is interesting that the Restatement Second itself notes that any party
who has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue has been accorded
the elements of due process. In the absence of circumstances suggesting the
appropriateness of allowing him to relitigate the issue, there is no good reason
for refusing to treat the issue as settled so far as he is concerned other than
that of making the burden of litigation risk and expense symmetrical between
him and his adversaries.
RErSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMEN-Ts § 88, Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975) [§ 85].
Id. § 68.1(e) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977) [§ 28].
o Id. §.68.1, Comment j (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977) [§ 28].
Sl Id. § 68.1(e) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977) [§ 28].
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on an issue even though it was not "actually litigated" in the first
action. This matter was taken to the floor of the Institute, but
received little consideration. 2 Although there might appear to be
little disagreement on this matter, a body of well-considered au-
thority rejects the position of the Institute on this point."
Two examples illustrate the difference between the position
adopted by the Restatement Second and that supported by this con-
trary body of authority. Suppose, in civil litigation, a plaintiff
alleges facts A, B, C, and D to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. Suppose further that the litigation involves a substan-
tial amount of money, thereby insuring that the litigants have in-
centive to litigate the matter fully. If the defendant's answer de-
nies A and B, and admits C and D, the only fact issues actually
litigated would be A and B. If the defendant loses at trial, in a
second action a question might arise concerning the preclusive
effect of the first judgment. Clearly, the judgment would pre-
clude relitigation of A and B. But what of issues C and D, which
were also necessary for the decision? The defendant chose not to
litigate these facts; he conceded C and D when he had incentive
to litigate fully, and when he in fact chose to litigate only A and
B. I think that there should be a presumption of preclusion on C
and D. The defendant's admission, in the first action, of C and D,
when they were essential to the decision and when the defendant
had incentive to litigate, sufficiently justifies such a presumption
of preclusion.
For a second example, suppose the United States, after
obtaining a guilty plea to a charge of income tax evasion, seeks a
civil judgment against the convicted defendant for the unpaid tax
plus penalties. Because the original criminal prosecution involved
a felony, the defendant clearly had incentive to litigate. Should
the defendant be allowed to litigate the fact issues necessarily de-
termined in the criminal prosecution? Should not the second
court hold that the judgment in the criminal prosecution pre-
sumptively established the necessary facts for the civil litigation? If
the defendant had been convicted after a plea of not guilty, the
Restatement Second would hold for preclusion, but would deny pre-
clusion on the plea of guilty. Many jurisdictions would equate the
plea of guilty and the finding of guilt after the plea of not
guilty, 4 and hold relitigation precluded.
32 54 ALI PROCEEDINGS 164-66 (1977).
s See text accompanying notes 50-139 infra.
See notes 82-86 and accompanying text infra.
1981]
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There is much to support the position that preclusion should
follow from a conceded fact issue if it was necessary for the orig-
inal decision. Of course, a number of exceptions would limit this
general rule, but the burden should generally be on the appar-
ently precluded party to show why preclusion should not arise. In
contrast, the Restatement Second concludes, in section 68 [section
27], that preclusion would never arise from a fact issue not
"actually litigated."
1. Consideration of "Actually Litigated"
The "actually litigated" requirement was discussed by the
advisors and the Council prior to the 1973 meeting of the Insti-
tute. In a distribution to the advisors in November, 1974, the
problem of the "actually litigated" requirement was covered in a
memorandum with extensive correspondence. However, the Insti-
tute did not consider the requirement until the 1977 meeting. It
was then raised on the floor of the Institute, but there was no
apparent support for the speaker, and the Institute apparently
approved the draft of section 68 [section 27] as submitted.
During the early stages of the consideration of the "actually
litigated" requirement by the advisors, the preclusive effect of a
criminal conviction based on a plea of guilty was raised. The Re-
porter indicated the advisors would consider this at a later time,
and that the question of the "actually litigated" requirement
would be addressed again.
At the final meeting of the Advisory Committee in Tucker's
Town, Bermuda, in 1979, the advisors considered briefly the pre-
clusive effect of criminal prosecutions. Because of the numerous
times the problem had been addressed and the apparent firmness
of the resolve of the Reporter on this point, it was not given
much consideration. Apparently the Reporter did feel that the
question of the preclusive effect of a conviction based on a plea of
guilty needed to be faced, for the tentative draft presented to the
Institute at the meeting in Washington, D.C., in 1980 included a
new provision dealing with "actually litigated" which was added to
the section dealing with criminal prosecutions."
' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 133, Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980)
[§ 85].
472 [Vol. 66:464
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2. Justifications for the "Actually Litigated" Requirement
The Restatement Second offers several reasons to support its adop-
don of the "actually litigated" requirement. First, the Comment to
section 68 [section 27] states that an action may involve "so small an
amount that litigation of the issue may cost more than the value
of the lawsuit." 6 This is a rather curious rationale. It does not
support the "actually litigated" requirement; rather it supports a
rejection of issue preclusion under any circumstances. If there is
insufficient incentive to litigate a matter, then there should be no
issue preclusion. Litigation in small claims courts or prosecutions
for misdemeanors cannot give rise to issue preclusion because
often those actions provide litigants with inadequate incentive to
litigate. Although the line is not clearly defined, it seems reason-
able to conclude that prosecutions for felonies and civil litigation
involving substantial amounts will give rise to issue preclusion.
The burden properly falls on the presumably precluded party to
show why issue preclusion should not apply. s7
Second, the Comment justifies the "actually litigated" re-
quirement on the ground that "the forum may be an inconvenient
one in which to produce the necessary evidence or in which to
litigate at all." 38 If a valid judgment is going to be handed down,
then this forum must have jurisdiction over the defendant and it
is the forum of choice of the plaintiff. As the forum of choice of
the plaintiff, it is proper to hold that the plaintiff should be
bound by any adverse decision reached by the court. It is only in
the case of the defendant that he might be able to assert that he
should not be bound because it is inconvenient. 9
In light of (a) the present constitutional limitations on the
exercise of jurisdiction over defendants, ° (b) the fact that the suit
by definition involves a substantial interest,4 and (c) the availabil-
ity of procedures to get and present the relevant evidence,42 this
' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977)
[§ 27].
s See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977)
[§ 27].
" Even this argument has questionable validity if the party does appear and litigates
some of the issues but concedes some necessary for the decision.
40 Savchuk v. Rush, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
"' This is true because issue preclusion can arise only from actions involving substantial
interests, monetary or otherwise. See note 17 supra.
42 The federal courts and most state courts have rules that authorize the use of deposi-
tions, interrogatories, requests for admission, physical and mental examinations, produc-
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justification is not very persuasive. Would it not be better to hold
for issue preclusion, and then permit the apparently precluded
party to explain why preclusion should not apply?
The Comment also gives as a reason for the "actually liti-
gated" rule that a rule to the contrary "might serve to discourage
compromise, to decrease the likelihood that the issues in an action
would be narrowed by stipulation, and thus to intensify
litigation." This litigation, where there is the incentive to liti-
gate, must involve substantial interests on the part of the parties.
The issue preclusion that may flow from the judgment does not
change the suit from unimportant to important. The suit is, by
definition, important. If a compromise is going to be discouraged,
it probably will be by the size of the present suit. If there is going
to be a refusal to stipulate and thus narrow issues, in all probabil-
ity it will be because of the importance of the instant suit and not
because of the issue preclusion that may flow from the decision.
The Comment does give, albeit somewhat tangentially, five
reasons for holding for preclusion even though not actually liti-
gated. These are (1) conserving judicial resources, (2) maintaining
consistency, (3) avoiding oppression or harassment, (4) avoiding
the difficult decision whether an issue has been actually litigated,
and finally (5) because "the party's reasons for not litigating in the
prior action may be such that preclusion would be
appropriate." 4 4 The Restatement Second concludes that the balance
is clearly in favor of the "actually litigated" requirement.45
3. Down the Slippery Slope
The significance of the Reporter's decision to incorporate the
"actually litigated" requirement into the issue preclusion rule is
magnified by the inclusion of other provisions that were adopted
in the interest of consistency. The provisions concerning the pre-
clusive effect of convictions based on pleas of guilty provide the
most egregious example of the consequences spawned by the Re-
porter's desire for internal consistency. The Comment to section
133 [section 85] states:
tion of documents, and subpoena duces tecum to obtain documents in the hands of non-
parties to the action. These various devices can be used to develop all of the facts involved.
Production of information is not limited to the jurisdiction in which the court is sitting.
'- RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977) [§
271.
, Id.
45 Id.
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Actual adjudication. The rule of this Section presupposes that the
issue in question was actually litigated in the criminal
prosecution.... Accordingly, the rule of this section does not
apply where the criminal judgment was based on a plea of nolo
contendere or a plea of guilty. A plea of nolo contendere by defini-
tion obviates actual adjudication and under prevailing inter-
pretation is not an admission. A defendant who pleads guilty
may be held to be estopped in subsequent civil litigation from
contesting facts representing the elements of the offense.
However, under the terms of this Restatement such an estoppel
is not a matter of issue preclusion, because the issue has not
actually been litigated, but is a matter of the law of evidence
beyond the scope of this Restatement.
46
To say that the effect of the first proceeding was a matter of the
law of evidence is to totally disregard a developing body of law
which holds for issue preclusion in cases where the criminal con-
viction is based on a plea of guilty.47 This authority does not rely
on an admission against interest-an evidentiary matter; rather it
holds that a judgment is preclusive on the issues necessary for
conviction.
The Reporter obviously felt troubled again by the actually
litigated problem when, in section 15 [section 12], he wrote about
subject matter jurisdiction not expressly determined. Comment d
to that section suggests there are two possible approaches. Under
one, a party may raise subject matter jurisdiction at any time. The
other approach, according to the Reporter, is
to say that the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, like questions
of notice, territorial jurisdiction, and those concerning the
merits, is implicitly resolved by the act of entering judgment.
On this view, the entry of judgment should be taken as equiva-
lent to actual litigation on the issue of subject matter jurisdic-
tion and hence result in its becoming res judicata.
The underlying consideration in resolving such situations
is essentially the same as when the issue was actually litigated in
the first action. Preclusion should therefore apply unless the
losing party should be afforded opportunity to reopen the con-
troversy, by reason of the circumstances referred to in Subsec-
tion (1)(a) and (b). 8
Id. § 133, Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980) [§ 85].
47 See Vestal, Issue Preclusion and Criminal Prosecutions, 65 IowA L. REv. 281, 294-96
(1980); notes 54-61 and accompanying text infra.
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 15, Comment d (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1979)
[§ 121.
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This second approach relies on the notion of implicit litigation, so
that the entry of judgment is construed as the equivalent of actual
litigation of the issue. If we can use fictional actual litigation, such
as this, then many difficulties of the "actually litigated" rule dis-
appear.
The desire for consistency also led to a retreat from a posi-
tion adopted by the first Restatement. The Reporter's Note to sec-
tion 68 [section 27] of the Restatement Second states:
One minor change from the first Restatement should be noted.
It was there stated that if a fact put in issue in the pleadings is
admitted by the adversary at trial, and in consequence no proof
is offered, the question is "actually litigated" within the mean-
ing of § 68 [§ 27]. The present Comment states that an issue is
not "actually litigated" if an admission is made by the adversary
before evidence is introduced. 9
It may be questioned whether this is a minor change but it cer-
tainly reflects a significant difference in attitude.
These examples highlight the difficulty the Reporter experi-
enced in attempting to adhere strictly to the "actually litigated"
requirement.-" They indicate that a general rule of issue preclu-
sion omitting the "actually litigated" requirement may be more
desirable.
4 Id. § 68, Reporter's Note (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977) [§ 27].
5 The attitude of the Reporter concerning the preclusive effect to be given to a con-
sent judgment is apparently found in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 99, Com-
ment f, Illustration 10 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977) [§ 51]. In this illustration a judgment was
entered by agreement for $1,000 for the plaintiff. Payment of the amount was made by
the defendant/driver. The illustration concluded that "[tihe judgment does not preclude
[the plaintiff] from bringing an action against [the owner of the car involved in the
accident] but any liability that may be established against [the owner] is discharged to the
extent of $1,000." Id.
Implicit in this statement is the possibility of recovery of more than $1,000 by the
plaintiff in the action against the owner. Section 99(2) provides, "A judgment in favor of
the injured person is conclusive upon him as to the amount of his damages," with certain
exceptions not applicable. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 99 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1977) [§ 51]. Applying this rule to Illustration 10, one would be forced to conclude that
the plaintiff, having received the $1,000, cannot recover against the owner. The $1,000 is
the limit of recovery. If the draftsman is saying that there is no preclusive effect because
the judgment is by consent, then something is being added to the wording of § 99(2)
[§ 51]. Beyond this, it would seem reasonable to say that the plaintiff, having accepted the
$1,000, should be precluded from seeking relief from any other source. It may be that the
amount involved in the first suit was not sufficient to provide an incentive to litigate fully,
and if this is true there may not be issue preclusion. However, there is no reason to believe
that this was the point being made in this illustration. See note 17 supra.
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4. Existing Authority
A litigant may concede an issue in a number of different
ways. The litigant may admit in the pleadings, either affirmatively
or by failure to deny. A defendant may plead guilty in a criminal
prosecution. A court may enter a judgment by default against a
litigant. Similarly, opposing litigants may settle their disputes by
consent judgments or through judgments by confession. In each
of these situations a judgment is based on at least some facts the
parties have not actually litigated. It would seem desirable to ex-
amine what the cases are holding at the present time in each of
these conceded issue situations, in considering what preclusive
effect, if any, should obtain.
a. Waiver; Admission or Failure to Deny in Pleading. In the
course of litigating a case a defendant may fail to deny, or may actu-
ally admit, certain essential allegations made by the plaintiff. For
example, in the federal court, the defendant may not controvert
the allegations of federal court jurisdiction properly contained in
the initial paragraph of a complaint in the federal court.
Assume that in suit I between A and B, which turns on facts
w, x, y, and z alleged by plaintiff A, defendant B denies only y
and z, and a judgment is for the plaintiff. It seems logical to hold
that the first suit determined all four facts, thereby precluding
relitigation of those issues. All were necessary for the judgment; B
had the incentive and opportunity to litigate all four issues and
did, in fact, contest two of them. What then of w and x, issues
uncontroverted in, but essential to, the original judgment, in sub-
sequent litigation? Should the defendant's failure to controvert
these issues preclude their relitigation? In Scott Paper Co. v. Fort
Howard Paper Co.,"1 the court said that a party in such a situation
should be barred from relitigation:
-" 343 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Wis. 1972). See also Oldham v. Pritchett, 599 F.2d 274 (8th
Cir. 1979), where the court held that the precluded party had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate a particular issue but failed to do so. The Oldham court, in holding for preclu-
sion, stated,
Despite the motivation and opportunity to do so, the Oldhams failed to exercise
their right to introduce evidence relating to Pritchett's alleged comparative or
contributory negligence. This tactical decision by the Oldhams not to partici-
pate as "laboring oars" in the limitation action does not, under such circum-
stances, foreclose the application of collateral estoppel.
Id. at 280. The court, citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979), held
the party collaterally estopped and indicated that this conclusion is "consistent with and
supportive of the policy underlying the doctrine of estoppel recently articulated by the
Supreme Court." Id. at 280.
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[I]t has been held that where there is reason to believe that the
failure of a party to litigate an issue is an admission of lack of
validity of that party's claim, future litigation of that claim can
be precluded.... [I]t is our opinion that the record in this case
establishes that the defendant, in presenting its case, vigorously
presented all matters which it thought might bring success.
Matters not presented which could have been offered ... were
not offered, in our opinion, because the defendant admitted
their lack of merit. Even under the doctrine of collateral estop-
pel, their presentation must be barred at this time.5 2
Indeed, logic suggests that a party should be precluded from re-
litigating all issues necessary for the initial judgment. It is difficult
to posit a reason why a defendant who conceded issues in the first
action would feel that he should be able to contest those same
issues in a second suit.
The "actually litigated" requirement also presents problems
when neither party contests the court's subject matter jurisdiction
and the court renders judgment for the plaintiff." If the plain-
tiff then takes the judgment to another state and sues on it there,
may the defendant question the first court's subject matter juris-
diction? The defendant will argue that because the issue had not
been litigated, it can be raised in the suit on the judgment. The
argument should fail. It would seem logical to conclude that the
defendant, in litigating fully the merits, implicitly conceded that
the court had subject matter jurisdiction. Having had the incen-
tive and opportunity to litigate, the defendant should be pre-
cluded.
b. Guilty Pleas. Courts frequently accord a guilty plea some
weight in civil litigation. Many regard the plea of guilty as an
admission-a judicial admission or an admission against
interest-that is admissible in a civil suit as substantive evidence
of the fact.5 4 Increasingly, courts are not simply admitting a pre-
vious guilty plea as evidence but are speaking of the preclusive
52 Id. at 229.
5 See notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra.
See generally Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 1287 (1951). The theory is that the plea is a judi-
cial admission of the truth of the charges: "[The safeguards afforded the accused under
criminal procedure are greater than those in a civil action, so that he has no cause for
complaint that an adverse decision ... should be used against him." Id. at 1289.
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effect of such a judgment."5 For example, in United States v.
Bower,5 the court was
called upon to go one step further than admission of the cri-
minal record in evidence; it [was] called upon to direct a verdict
on the strength of that record, that is, to apply the rule of
estoppel by judgment with the full force and significance of the
record. The alternative is to require the Government to prove
all over again that of which the defendant stands convicted out
of his own mouth. 57
The court found that the basic rationale supporting issue preclu-
sion applies to guilty plea situations. "[T]here is reason for insist-
ing that, if a point is settled, it should be settled for all related
purposes and that it should operate as an estoppel as well as a
defense." 5 8
Numerous cases hold that issues necessarily established by a
finding based on a guilty plea cannot be litigated in a subsequent
action between the same parties. 9 For example, in United States v.
Ben Grunstein and Sons Co.,6 the defendant's guilty plea in the first
action necessarily decided the issues of the existence of a con-
spiracy and the defendant's participation. The court held that
those two issues were not open to relitigation in a second suit
brought by the government to recover damages. The court
emphasized that: (1) the parties were the same in both suits; (2)
the issues were distinctly raised and directly determined by the
first guilty plea; and (3) the precluded issues were identical in
both suits. The court restated the policy behind collateral
estoppel-an issue, once determined, cannot be relitigated-and
stated that it was immaterial whether the judgment of conviction
resulted from a trial or from a plea of guilty.6'
Giving preclusive effect to a conviction is a different matter. More and more courts,
however, are holding that a judgment of conviction can give rise to issue preclusion in a
subsequent civil suit. See, e.g., United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons Co., 127 F. Supp. 907
(D.NJ. 1955); United States v. American Precision Prod. Corp., 115 F. Supp. 823 (D.N.J.
1953).
m 95 F. Supp. 19 (E.D. Tenn. 1951).
57 Id. at 21.
5 Id.
" See, e.g., United States v. Eagle Beef Cloth Co., 235 F. Supp. 491 (E.D.N.Y. 1964);
O'Neill v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 367 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); United States v. Schneider, 139
F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); United States v. Accardo, 113 F. Supp. 783 (D.N.J.), aff'd
per curiam 208 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 952 (1954).
60 127 F. Supp. 907 (D.N.J. 1955).
61 Id. at 909. In United States v. Guzzone, 273 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1959), the court
emphasized that "It is well established that a prior criminal conviction may work an estop-
1981] 479
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The court in United States v. American Precision Products
Corp.,62 used this same sort of analysis. The president of the cor-
poration had previously pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud
the government. In the subsequent civil action under the False
Claims Act,6" that court held the corporation president precluded
from relitigating the issue of fraud. "Since this conspiracy is in
substance the same as that to which he pleaded guilty on the
above indictment, and the parties in this civil suit are the same as
in those criminal proceedings, he is estopped by the record to
deny civil liability as such conspirator here."' Similarly, in Arctic
Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner,65 the tax court applied issue preclu-
sion in a guilty plea situation:
It is not material that Arctic's conviction was based upon a
guilty plea, because for purposes of applying the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, as well as for other purposes, there is no
difference between a judgment of conviction based upon such a
plea and a judgment of conviction rendered after a trial on the
merits.... Arctic's plea of guilty to this indictment was there-
fore a conclusive judicial admission that its return for 1946 was
false and fraudulent and that the deficiency in tax which was
the necessary result of its being filed was due to fraud with
intent to evade tax.66
In United States v. Globe Remodeling Co.,67 the court said, "[E]ach
criminal count to which [defendant] pleaded guilty distinctly put
in issue and their plea of guilty directly determined that they
made and used a document containing a statement known by
them to be false for obtaining [Federal Housing Authority] insur-
ance on a home improvement loan."68 In this second suit,
brought by the government for reimbursement, the court held
pel in favor of the government in a subsequent civil proceeding, but such estoppel extends
only to questions distinctly put in issue and directly determined in the criminal prosecu-
tion." Id. at 123. In this case the issue was superfluous to the initial conviction, so collateral
estoppel was not applied. Id. This language of "directly determined" is less restrictive than
"actually litigated" but still protects against inappropriate application. An issue can be
directly determined without being actually litigated.
62 115 F. Supp. 823 (D.N.J. 1953).
63 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-234 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
115 F. Supp. at 826.
43 T.C. 68 (1964).
6 Id. at 75.
67 196 F. Supp. 652 (D. Vt. 1961).
61 Id. at 656.
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that the defendants were estopped from denying the falsity of
their statements."
Several decisions have even suggested that application of
issue preclusion may be more appropriate when the first convic-
don was based on a guilty plea than a trial. 0  In United States v.
Schneider,7' the court observed:
Relitigation in a civil action of an issue determined adversely to
the defendant in a prior criminal proceeding is foreclosed,
whether the prior determination was based on the verdict of a
jury ... or on a plea of guilty.... Indeed, where the prior
conviction resulted from a plea of guilty there would appear to
be greater warrant for application of the doctrine since the de-
fendant has admitted the truth of the charges contained in the
indictment.72
Similarly, in Plunkett v. Commissioner,s a court of appeals held that
a guilty plea constituted an admission of all the elements of a
formal criminal charge. The court looked to the particular cir-
cumstances behind the guilty plea to insure that it was not the
result of either coercion or the defendant's desire for expediency.
The existence of a plea bargain did not make this otherwise
voluntary and knowing plea unfit for application of collateral
estoppel, although the court allowed the defendant an opportu-
nity to explain his plea to avoid its preclusive effect. In evaluating
preclusive effect of the guilty plea, the court considered whether,
under this set of facts, it could reasonably assume that the plea
amounted to the defendant's admission of the issues necessary to
the first judgment.74 If so, then the party should be estopped
from relitigating the same issue.
Most of these cases involve civil litigation between the gov-
ernment and the convicted individual. However, because applica-
tion of issue preclusion no longer requires identity of parties in
the two proceedings, convictions based on pleas of guilty will
' Id. The test used in this case, whether the issue was distinctly put in issue and direct-
ly determined by the first suit, was first stated in Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors
Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 569-72 (1951). In United States v. Globe Remodeling, 196 F. Supp.
652 (D. Vt. 1961), an issue was distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a plea of
guilty without actual litigation.
70 See O'Neill v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 367 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); United States v. Ben
Grunstein & Sons Co., 127 F. Supp. 907 (D.NJ. 1955).
"' 139 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
72 Id. at 829.
- 465 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1972).
74 Id. at 305-06.
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undoubtedly become more important in civil litigation between
private parties as well. In Metros v. United States District Court for
District of Colorado,75 the defendant in the first action pleaded
guilty to possession of heroin. In a subsequent civil action brought by
the defendant against the police for money damages arising out
of an allegedly illegal search, the court held the defendant es-
topped from contesting the issue of probable cause to arrest. 6  Be-
cause the defendant had had ample opportunity to raise the issue
at his criminal trial, the court treated his failure to do so as a
waiver of the right to raise it later. The court observed that the
defendant must have recognized the importance of the legality of
the search77 and that the severe consequences of conviction pro-
vided sufficient incentive to litigate the issue at his criminal trial.
In Hooper v. Guthrie,7" a convicted criminal defendant sued the
arresting officer for unlawful arrest and unlawful imprisonment.
The defendant had pleaded guilty in the earlier prosecution. The
court held that even though the defendant had not litigated the
question at a criminal trial, "the generally accepted rule is that a
judgment of conviction, based on a plea of guilty, is conclusive in
a civil suit between the same parties of all the issues that would
have been determined by a conviction after a contested trial."7 9
The court held that the conviction based on a plea of guilty fore-
closed litigation of an issue in a subsequent civil action.
As these cases demonstrate, when a defendant who has been
convicted after a plea of guilty later tries, through a civil action, to
-' 441 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1971).
16 Id. at 317. Cf. Williams v. Liberty, 461 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1972) (defendant found
guilty of resisting arrest and battery in the first suit; in second suit by defendant against
police for use of excessive force, court held that issue preclusion was not appropriate. The
two claims-resisting arrest and excessive force-were not mutually exclusive. The court
distinguished this situation from Palma v. Powers, 295 F. Supp. 924 (N.D. Ill. 1969)).
" The courts are careful to distinguish which issues should be precluded. In United
States v. Rubin, 243 F.2d 900 (7th Cir. 1957), the court stated: "Consequently, though the
plea was res adjudicata of all averments of the indictment, well pleaded, it was not decisive
of the additional charge first made in the civil action...." Id. at 902. There would be no
preclusion on additional charges or elements necessary for the second judgment that were
not essential to the first action.
In Diamond v. Holstein, 333 Mich. 74, 127 N.W.2d 896 (1964), the defendant's plea
of guilty to an unsafe driving charge was not conclusive as to the entire civil action charg-
ing negligence. The plaintiff still needed to show that the defendant's driving proximately
caused the accident.
, 390 F. Supp. 1327 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
Id. at 1334 (quoting lB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACriCE 0.418[1] (2d ed. 1974)). Accord,
Brazzel v. Adams, 493 F.2d 489, 490 (5th Cir. 1974); Metros v. United States Dist. Court,
441 F.2d 313, 317-19 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Accardo, 113 F. Supp. 783, 786
(D.N.J.), aff'd, 208 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 952 (1954).
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profit from his criminal act, there is very strong support for the
extension of issue preclusion as a way to protect parties who were
not involved in the initial suit."0 In addition to preclusive effect
in a subsequent civil action, a judgment based on a guilty plea
may also give rise to preclusion in a subsequent criminal
proceeding.81 A number of courts have concluded that issue pre-
clusion should arise from a criminal conviction based on a guilty
plea. These include several district courts,82 and the courts of
appeals for the Fifth," the Seventh, 4 the Eighth, 85 and the Ninth
Circuits.8 6
c. Default Judgment. It is reasonable, under certain circum-
stances, for issue preclusion to arise out of a default judgment
against the defendant to a civil action. Where the defendant had
contacts with the forum sufficient to justify exercise of that
forum's jurisdiction over the defendant and where the defendant
had both the incentive to litigate the matter fully (because he had
a substantial amount at stake) and the opportunity to present his
side of the controversy, then preclusion should arise on all issues
necessary for the decision, unless a party presents some valid
reason for non-preclusion. To further society's interests in max-
imizing judicial efficiency, issue preclusion, with safeguards such
80 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 405 F.2d 683 (8th Cir.
1968).
11 Rosenberg v. Martin, 478 F.2d 520, 525 (2d Cir. 1973); Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d
1270 (3d Cir. 1970); Simms v. Reiner, 419 F. Supp. 468, 475 (N.D. Il1. 1976); Lathon v.
Parish of Jefferson, 358 F. Supp. 558, 560 (E.D. La. 1973); Martynn v. Darcy, 333 F. Supp.
1236, 1240 (E.D. La. 1971).
1 See Pouncey v. Ryan, 396 F. Supp. 126 (D. Conn. 1975); Hooper v. Guthrie, 390 F.
Supp. 1327 (W.D. Pa. 1975); United States v. Levinson, 369 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Mich.
1973).
10 Brazell v. Adams, 493 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1974).
14 Nathan v. Tenna Corp., 560 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1977).
" Hernandez-Uribe v. United States, 515 F.2d 20 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1057 (1976).
m Ivers v. United States, 581 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1978). See also Vestal, Issue Preclusion
and Criminal Prosecutions, 65 IOWA L. REV. 281 (1980) and cases cited therein at notes
122-25.
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as those found in sections 68.1 87 and 88188 [sections 27 and 291,
should prevent litigation of issues necessarily determined through
a default judgment.
"' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977) [§ 28] pro-
vides:
Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final
judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, relitigation of the
issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded in the follow-
ing circumstances:
(a) The party against whom preclusion is sought could not, as a matter of
law, have obtained review of the judgment by an appellate court in the initial
action; or
(b) The issue is one of law and (i) the two actions involve claims that are
substantially unrelated, or (ii) a new determination is warranted in order to
take account of an intervening change in the applicable legal context or other-
wise to avoid inequitable administrtion of the laws; or
(c) A new determination of the issue is warranted by differences in the
quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed in the two courts or by
factors relating to the allocation of jurisdiction between them; or
(d) The party against whom preclusion is sought had a significantly
heavier burden of persuasion with respect to the issue in the initial action than
in the subsequent action; the burden has shifted to his adversary; or the adver-
sary has a significantly heavier burden than he had in the first action; or
(e) There is a dear and convincing need for a new determination of the
issue (i) because of the potential adverse impact of the determination on the
public interest or the interests of persons not themselves parties in the initial
action, (ii) because it was not sufficiently foreseeable at the time of the initial
action that the issue would arise in the context of a subsequent action, or (iii)
because the party sought to be concluded, as a result of the conduct of his
adversary or other special circumstances, did not have an adequate opportunity
or incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial action.
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975) [§ 29] pro-
vides:
A party precluded from relitigating an issue with an opposing party, in
accordance with §§ 68 and 68.1, is also precluded from doing so with another
person unless he lacked full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first
action or unless other circumstances justify affording him an opportunity to
relitigate the issue. The circumstances to which consideration should be given
include those enumerated in § 68.1 and also whether:
(1) Treating the issue as conclusively determined would be incompatible
with an applicable scheme of administering the remedies in the actions in-
volved;
(2) The forum in the second action affords the party against whom pre-
clusion is asserted procedural opportunities in the presentation and determina-
tion of the issue that were not available in the first action and that might likely
result in the issue's being differently determined;
(3) The person seeking to invoke favorable preclusion, or to avoid un-
favorable preclusion, could have effected joinder in the first action between
himself and his present adversary;
(4) The determination relied on as preclusive was itself inconsistent with
another determination of the same issue;
1981] A MODEST DISSENT 485
In Peckham v. Family Loan Co., 9 the court applied issue pre-
clusion to issues actually litigated or to issues necessarily involved
in the conclusion reached. The majority of courts adhering to this
theory state the rule in terms of issues necessarily determined by
the first action ° In Mitchell v. Jones,91 the court held: "It is our
understanding ... that a default judgment conclusively estab-
lishes, between the parties so far as subsequent proceedings on a
different cause of action are concerned, the truth of all material
allegations contained in the complaint in the first action, and ev-
ery fact necessary to uphold the default judgment .... ,, 1
In United States v. Perry,93 another recent decision in which
issue preclusion arose out of a prior default judgment, the gov-
ernment defaulted in the first action brought by Perry to quiet
title. In the second suit, the government tried to set aside the
property transfer as fraudulent. Although the causes of action
were not identical, the two actions involved the same parties, and
the quiet title action had necessarily determined the issue of
fraudulent transfer. The court found issue preclusion even
though the United States had defaulted and therefore had not
"actually" litigated the issue.4
(5) The prior determination may have been affected by relationships
among the parties to the first action that are not present in the subsequent
action, or was based on a compromise verdict or finding;
(6) Treating the issue as conclusively determined may complicate deter-
mination of issues in the subsequent action or prejudice the interests of another
party thereto;
(7) Other circumstances make it appropriate that the party be permitted
to relitigate the issue.
196 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1952).
Holdings are usually based on issues necessarily decided, but they also speak of
issues properly pleaded and issues that might have been litigated. Typical judicial state-
ments of the rule include Lawhorn v. Wellford, 179 Tenn. 625, 631, 168 S.W.2d 790, 792
(1943):
A judgment taken by default is conclusive by way of estoppel in respect to all
such matters and facts as are well pleaded and properly raised, and material to
the case made by declaration or other pleadings, and such issues cannot be
relitigated in any subsequent action between the parties or their privies.
Id. at 631, 168 S.W.2d at 792 (quoting Taylor v. Sledge, 110 Tenn. 263, 268-269, 75 S.W.
1074, 1075 (1903)). In David v. Nemerofsky, 41 A.2d 838, 839 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1945),
the court stated, "It [the binding effect] includes all facts alleged and necessary to support
the judgment, and a judgment by default or confession is equally binding on the party
against whom estoppel is caimed." Id. at 839.
" 172 Cal. App. 2d 580, 342 P.2d 503 (1959).
9 Id. at 586-87, 342 P.2d at 507.
93 473 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1973).
14 Id. at 648-49.
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The Perry court applied the analysis discussed in Palma v.
Powers.95 Preclusion existed because the government: (1) under-
stood the importance of the litigation; (2) could have easily con-
tested the claim; (3) had had an opportunity for a full and fair
litigation of the issue of fraudulent transfer; and (4) should have
foreseen the preclusive effects of its default in the event of a
second suit. The court examined the reason for the government's
default and found a gross administrative oversight on the part of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The purpose of the quiet
title action-a final settlement for the property owners-
outweighed the administrative inconvenience to the government
in litigating the issue in the first suit. Therefore, the court consid-
ered it unfair to force Perry to relitigate this issue, yet not unduly
harsh to preclude the government just as it would have precluded
any other private party under these circumstances.96
Several courts have regarded a default judgment as a waiver
of the right to contest the issue in a subsequent action. Under this
rationale, the record must show that the party intended the
waiver. The test these courts apply is whether, in view of the sur-
rounding facts, the parties intended the default to be an" admis-
sion of the other party's claim."7 In Harvey v. Griffiths,9" the court
stated:
It is immaterial that the judgment which is assailed was pro-
cured by default. The defendants in that action had an oppor-
tunity to appear and protect their interest. They deliberately
waived the right to their day in court by failing to appear and
answer the complaint. A default judgment is an estoppel as to
all issues necessarily litigated therein and determined thereby
exactly like any other judgment provided the court acquired
jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter involved in the
suit.9
The defaulting party can avoid preclusion by giving an ex-
planation of his failure to litigate.' °0 The court can then decide
95 295 F. Supp. 924 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (discussed at notes 21-23 and accompanying text
supra; notes 141-43 and accompanying text infra.
9 473 F.2d at 648-49.
9, See, e.g., Guynn v. Wilhelm, 226 Or. 606, 360 P.2d 312 (1961).
91 133 Cal. App. 17, 23 P.2d 532 (3d Dist. 1933).
9 Id. at 22-23, 23 P.2d at 534.
"0 See United States v. Perry, 473 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1973); Lynch v. Lynch, 250 Iowa
407, 94 N.W.2d 105 (1959); Guynn v. Wilhelm, 226 Or. 606, 360 P.2d 312 (1961).
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whether the particular facts support a presumption that the de-
fault judgment constitutes an admission. Parties may thus avoid
preclusion in cases of extreme hardship. A supposedly precluded
party may be able to establish that his default was not an admis-
sion of liability but rather a deliberate choice to avoid litigating in
a particular forum. A defendant, for example, might have be-
lieved that the forum did not have jurisdiction over him and so
he may have elected to contest the matter of personal jurisdiction
when suit was brought on the default judgment in another forum.
The controlling question courts should ask before applying
issue preclusion to a default judgment is not whether the parties
actually litigated the issue, but whether the party to be precluded
had an opportunity for a full and fair day in court.' New York
has developed such a "full and fair opportunity test." In Schwartz
v. Public Administrator,2 the court stated:
New York law has now reached the point where there are but
two necessary requirements for the invocation of the doctrine
of collateral estoppel. There must be an identity of issue which
has necessarily been decided in the prior action and is decisive
of the present action, and, second, there must have been a full
and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be
controlling.?°3
A United States district court in Michigan, in a thoughtful
opinion, considered what preclusive effect it should give to a de-
fault judgment. °4 The court paid lip service to the rule that issue
preclusion applied only to those issues which had been "actually"
or "fully litigated" in the prior action,05 but effectively undercut
the rule:
However, this rule does not refer to the quality or quantity of
argument or evidence addressed to an issue. It requires only
two things: first, that the issue has been effectively raised in the
prior action, either in the pleadings or through development of
01 Phillips v. Cooper, 253 Iowa 359, 360, 112 N.W.2d 317, 318 (1961).
102 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969). See also Ritchie v. Landau,
475 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1973); Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc. v. Prometo Co., 470 F.
Supp. 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
10- 24 N.Y.2d at 71, 246 N.E.2d at 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
104 Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors Ltd., 375 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Mich. 1974),
aff'd, 519 F.2d 119 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975).
105 Id. at 516.
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the evidence and argument at trial or on motion; and second,
that the losing party has had "a fair opportunity procedurally,
substantively, and evidentially" to contest the issue. The general
rule therefore is that subject to these restrictions default judg-
ments do constitute res judicata for purposes of both claim pre-
clusion and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel).,06
The court rejected the Restatement Second rule in favor of a possi-
bility of issue preclusion, and placed the burden on the sup-
posedly precluded party to explain why preclusion should not
apply: "a blanket refusal to recognize collateral estoppel in default
cases is far too heavy-handed and indiscriminate a remedy. The
two-part test referred to above is far more functional." 107
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,"°8 the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, 0 9 and state courts in Pennsylvania,"'
Colorado,"' New Mexico," 2 and Maryland"' have held that issue
preclusion may arise from default judgments.
When a court enters a default judgment against a defendant
who had full incentive and opportunity to litigate, later courts
should recognize a presumption in favor of issue preclusion but
provide the defendant an opportunity to show why preclusion is
inappropriate. For example, where a defendant defaults because
he prefers to litigate the question of jurisdiction in his own state,
it certainly seems inappropriate to hold for issue preclusion on
that question. On the other hand, issue preclusion should arise
from a default judgment that reflects an admission on the part of
the losing party that the facts asserted are true. If the default
implies that the defendant acknowledges the correctness of the
allegations against him, then a court should bar relitigation of the
issue.
d. Consent Judgments. Because a consent judgment is both an
agreement between the parties to the litigation and a judgment by
a court, it poses a unique problem in applying issue preclusion, a
problem differing somewhat from those presented by a judgment
based on either an admission in a pleading or a guilty plea.
1 6 Id.
117 Id. at 517.
108 See Brown v. Kenron Alum. & Glass Corp., 477 F.2d 526 (8th Cir. 1973).
101 See Williams v. Five Platters, 510 F.2d 963 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
1' See Zimmer v. Zimmer, 457 Pa. 488, 326 A.2d 318 (1974).
". See DeBoer v. District Court, 184 Colo. 112, 518 P.2d 942 (1974).
"1 See Gallegos v. Franklin, 89 N.M. 118, 547 P.2d 1160 (Ct. App. 1976).
"' See J. C. Penney Co. v. Harker, 23 Md. App. 121, 326 A.2d 228 (1974).
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A number of courts have held that a consent judgment does
not give rise to issue preclusion. The Supreme Court, denying
issue preclusive effect to a consent judgment, stated:
[U]nless we can say that [the consent judgments] were an ad-
judication of the merits, the doctrine of estoppel by judgment
would serve an unjust cause: it would become a device by which
a decision not shown to be on the merits would forever fore-
close inquiry into the merits. Estoppel by judgment includes
matters in a second proceeding which were actually presented
and determined in an earlier suit.... A judgment entered with
the consent of the parties may involve a determination of ques-
tions of fact and law by the court. But unless a showing is made
that that was the case, the judgment has no greater dignity, so
far as collateral estoppel is concerned, than any judgment en-
tered only as a compromise of the parties." 4
Courts should not, however, treat all consent judgments alike.
The Supreme Court's language suggests that issue preclusion
might be appropriate if the court entering a consent judgment
makes specific findings of fact. Indeed, courts have been willing
to bar litigation of an issue after a consent judgment where: (1)
the parties expressly stipulate that the judgment shall have col-
lateral effect;"' (2) the parties have partially litigated the case be-
fore the court enters the consent judgment;"6 and (3) the parties'
actions or statements indicate that they intended the judgment to
have preclusive effect."7 An examination of these categories of
cases shows that consent judgments have had, as they should
have, preclusive effect.
Because a consent judgment involves a contractual element,
if the parties expressly agree that courts shall give the judgment
preclusive effect, there is no reason to treat the judgment other-
wise. One commentator observes:
M United States v. International Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502, 506 (1952) (citations omitted).
"1 Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. United States, 113 U.S. 261 (1885); Harrison v. Bloom-
field Bldg. Indus., Inc., (6th Cir. 1970); Beucher v. Union Trust Co., 211 N.C. 377, 190
S.E. 226 (1937); Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Hess, 190 Okla. 669, 126 P.2d 534 (1942).
16 Siegel v. National Periodical Publ., Inc., 364 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 508
F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1974); Backus v. United States, 59 F.2d 242 (Ct. Cl. 1932), cert. denied,
288 U.S. 610 (1933); Macheras v. Syrmopoulos, 319 Mass. 485, 66 N.E.2d 351 (1946).
" Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. USM Corp., 525 F.2d 775 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
912 (1976); World's Finest Chocolate, Inc. v. World Candies, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 840 (N.D.
Ill. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1977).
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Parties may consent to a judgment for reasons ... unrelated to
the merits of the underlying claim. However, because of such a
judgment's consensual nature, there seems to be no reason
why, if the parties expressly so stipulate, collateral-estoppel
effect should not be accorded, provided it is limited to those
claims which might reasonably have been foreseen at the time
of the agreement.118
Where parties agree that a consent judgment will bind them
in any future litigation, courts have held them to that bargain.
These courts consider extrinsic evidence, surrounding circum-
stances, and the terms of the initial agreement to determine the
litigants' intentions. In Harrison v. Bloomfield Building Industries,"9
the Sixth Circuit held that a stipulated judgment and release
manifested "a clear intention of the parties with regard to the
disposition of all claims of fraud." 120 The court found for issue
preclusion arising from the earlier stipulated judgment and
release. 2 ,
Courts have also held that a consent judgment may give rise
to issue preclusion when the first court had partially tried the case
before it entered the consent judgment. Macheras v. Syrmopoulos 122
is illustrative. In the first suit the plaintiff had recovered damages
under a consent judgment from the defendant for damage done
to plaintiff's auto. In the second suit, the court held the defen-
dant estopped from litigating for personal injuries resulting from
the same accident. In the first action, the court had actually deter-
mined liability, and only the damages were arrived by the parties'
consent. Thus, in the second action, the court was not merely
administering the contract between the two parties; another court
had fully determined the negligence issue, thereby satisfying all
the policies that underlie application of issue preclusion. The court
said:
The judgment in the earlier action was res judicata. There the
parties and issues were the same as those here. It is not open to
the plaintiff to try the issues anew; she has had her day in
court.... That the judgment was entered by agreement of the
11s Note, The Consent Judgment as an Instrument of Compromise and Settlement, 72 HARV. L.
REv. 1314, 1320-21 (1959) (footnotes omitted).
119 435 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1970).
120 Id. at 1195.
121 Id.
122 319 Mass. 485, 66 N.E.2d 351 (1946).
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parties rather than by the court is of no materiality.... [I]f "by
their agreement after litigation has been entered upon, [the
parties] put the result in the form of a judgment in the pro-
ceeding, they thenceforth are as much bound by the legal effect
of the judgment as if it were the outcome which a'court would
have reached had the issues disclosed by the pleadings been
fully tried and decided." 23
In Backus v. United States,'14 the Internal Revenue Service had
made all the final determinations, and the proceedings had be-
gun, when the parties reached the consent agreement. The court
deemed issue preclusion appropriate, stating, "[A]ll matters affect-
ing the tax liability of plaintiff ... were finally and conclusively
settled by the agreements and stipulations executed and filed with
the Board of Tax Appeals and by the consent judgments entered
by the board." 125 In Siegel v. National Periodical Publications, Inc.,16
the court reached a similar result. In the first action, the parties
reached a consent agreement after a referee had made findings
of fact and the judge had formulated conclusions of law. The
consent judgment incorporated these findings. The Siegel court
held that the consent judgment precluded litigation of the issue in
a subsequent action. 27  These decisions seem correct. When a
consent judgment grows out of a judicial proceeding, it represents
more than a mere memorial of a settlement between the parties;
it is the final product of the litigation. As such, courts should
afford the consent judgment preclusive effect. 28
Courts have also given preclusive effect to consent judgments
when parties' actions or statements indicate an intent to be bound.
In Schlegel Manufacturing Co. v. USM Corp.,2 9 plaintiff alleged a
violation of a consent decree that had established the validity of
113 Id. at 486, 66 N.E.2d at 352 (quoting Ansara v. Regan, 276 Mass. 586, 589, 177 N.E.
671, 672 (1931) (citations omitted)).
124 59 F.2d 242 (Ct. Cl. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 610 (1933).
"' Id. at 255.
126 364 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 508 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1974).
"2 Id. at 1037.
28 See Kraly v. National Distillers Chem. Corp., 502 F.2d 1366 (7th Cir. 1974); Note,
'To Bind or Not to Bind": Bar and Merger Treatment of Consent Decrees in Patent Infringement
Litigation, 74 COLuM. L. REv. 1322 (1974). In Kraly, the court applied policies expressed by
the Supreme Court in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969), to consent decree adjudica-
tions of validity, and concluded that "[T]he licensee [was] not estopped from challenging the
validity of the patent, even though a prior consent decree incorporated an understanding
not to challenge the validity of the patent." 502 F.2d at 1369.
1- 525 F.2d 775 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912 (1976).
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plaintiff's patent and enjoined further infringement by the defen-
dant. The district court held that the consent decree barred the
defendant from challenging the validity of the patent. The Sixth
Circuit affirmed, stating: "Even though the degree of judicial in-
volvement is different between a consent decree and a litigated
result, we are not prepared to find that judicial involvement in a
consent decree is so inconsequential as to justify different
treatment." "I
In World's Finest Chocolate, Inc. v. World Candies, Inc.,'
another patent infringement action based on a prior consent de-
cree, the court examined "what the consent judgment means by
the plain intendment of the words used therein and whether the
conduct of the defendant has violated its provisions. "12 The
court concluded that the admission of infringement in the consent
judgment operated as a waiver of the right to submit evidence on
the issue of infringement in the subsequent proceeding for civil
contempt. 3'
In addition to the categories mentioned, courts have found
issue preclusion arising from consent judgments in other
situations." 4 Together, these cases suggest that it is undesirable
to have a rigid rule requiring "actual litigation" as a prerequisite
to issue preclusion. Existing authority certainly suggests that a
more flexible rule is desirable.
If it is true that some consent judgments should have preclu-
sive effect, then the only question is how courts should draw the
line between those that are preclusive and those that are not. The
Restatement Second rule would bar preclusive effect for all consent
judgments. The formulation urged in this Article would direct
courts to hold for preclusion unless the party to be precluded can
show that he should not be so bound. This rule would place a
110 Id. at 780. See also Broadview Chem. Corp. v. Loctite Corp., 474 F.2d 1391, 1395 (2d
Cir. 1973); Hirs v. Detroit Filter Corp. 424 F.2d 1040, 1041 (6th Cir. 1970); United States
ex rel. Shell Oil Co. v. Barco Corp., 430 F.2d 998, 1001-02 (8th Cir. 1970). But see Herbert
Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 739-40 (9th Cir. 1971).
1" 409 F. Supp. 840 (N.D. Ill. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1977).
3 Id. at 844.
"I Id. at 845.
"34 See United States v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 426, 429
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (antitrust action); Garrison v. Garrison, 138 Ga. App. 196, 197, 225 S.E.2d
773, 774 (1976) (consent decree concerning child support payments); Butler v. Butler, 253
Iowa 1084, 1110-11, 114 N.W.2d 595, 610-11 (1962) (establishment of trust in deceased's
estate); City of Chariton v. J. C. Blunk Constr. Co., 253 Iowa 805, 812-13, 112 N.W.2d
829, 832-33 (1962) (contract action to recover damages) (dicta); Missile v. Anne Arundel
County, 271 Md. 70, 77-79, 314 A.2d 451, 456 (1974) (equity action for refund of deposit).
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burden on the resisting party, but it is not an impossible burden.
Under this Article's analysis, the incentive-and-opportunity-to-
litigate test would apply to the consent judgment situation. If in-
centive and opportunity did not exist, then there should be no
preclusion. 5
e. Judgment by Confessions. Where a defendant, who has in-
centive and opportunity to litigate and who actually participated
in the litigation, allows the entering of a judgment by confession,
it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that issue preclusion should
arise from the judgment. The defendant has elected not to con-
test the matter but rather to allow the court to enter a judgment
by confession.3 6
f. Judgment by Confession under Cognovit Provision. When a
party enters into an agreement containing a cognovit provision in
a state that permits such a provision,3 7 he runs the risk that a
court will hand down a judgment against him without providing
any notice of, or opportunity to participate in, the proceeding. Is
this judgment preclusive of issues in subsequent litigation? It
seems apparent that this sort of judgment falls under section 68.1
[section 28] of the Restatement Second' so that there would be no
issue preclusion. Because the party did not have an adequate
opportunity for a full and fair adjudication in the initial action,
issue preclusion should not arise.1
9
5. Towards an Acceptable Rule
The "actually litigated" requirement undoubtedly endows the
Restatement Second rule with virtues of simplicity and certainty.
However, there are significant disadvantages. First, it allows litiga-
tion of issues that were necessary for the decision in the first ac-
tion and that the losing party conceded while litigating other
issues. This hardly engenders conservation of judicial resources.
Second, because a losing party is not bound by all necessary find-
' See notes 18-30 and accompanying text supra. Recall that §§ 68.1 and 88 of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTs [§§ 28, 29] specify several exceptions to the general
concept of preclusion.
ls See e.g., IOWA CODE § 676 (1979).
"s See D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972); Swarb v. Lennox, 405
U.S. 191 (1972).
138 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977) [§ 28] (re-
printed in full at note 87 supra).
"' Id., Comment j.
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ings of the judgment, the rule creates uncertainty about legal rela-
tionships even after a court has rendered a final judgment. Third,
the losing party, having had the incentive and opportunity to liti-
gate an issue, gains a second chance to litigate without any con-
comitant social benefit. Fourth, courts may reach inconsistent re-
sults on the same issue, which confuses the litigants, the courts,
and the public.
This Article advocates another position: that the question of
actual litigation is a consideration irrelevant to the determination
of issue preclusion. If the losing litigant had the incentive and
opportunity to litigate, and the issue was necessary for the deci-
sion, then issue preclusion arises unless one of the exceptions,
such as those found in sections 68.1 and 88 [sections 28 and 29],
applies. If "actual litigation" is of questionable significance in
some cases of asserted issue preclusion-and the authorities cer-
tainly support this position 4 -it seems desirable to adopt a rule
that would allow issue preclusion without regard to "actual litiga-
tion" in some situations. The present Restatement Second does not
so provide. It contains an absolute requirement of "actual litiga-
tion" before an issue can be precluded by a prior case. A much
preferable position would allow issue preclusion absent "actual
litigation" if other factors suggest that there should be preclusion.
Courts would then possess needed flexibility that is absent under
the rigid "actual litigation" requirement.
The court in Palma v. Powers .4 adopted a more flexible ap-
proach in a well-considered and well-stated opinion. The court
stated:
Although the requirement that the matter be actually con-
troverted in a prior proceeding has been frequently reiterated,
there are a number of well-considered cases which adopt the
position that, in certain situations, preclusion can arise even
though the issue was not contested in the first suit. For in-
stance, it is widely accepted by the state courts that a default
judgment is conclusive as to all issues necessarily litigated and
determined therein and has exactly the same validity and force
as any other judgment. Similarly, it is widely accepted that a
consent decree, under proper circumstances, is entitled to res
judicata effect and precludes litigation of the claims or issues
determined in the decree in subsequent actions between the
140 See notes 50-139 and accompanying text supra.
141 295 F. Supp. 924 (N.D. IM. 1969) (discussed at notes 21-23 and accompanying text
supra).
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parties. A further example of this idea is found in the sphere
of criminal law. It is generally established that "A plea of guilty
is not a mere admission of guilt. It is in and of itself a convic-
tion and as conclusive as the verdict of a jury." In the face of a
voluntary plea of guilty, it has been consistently held that a
criminal defendant cannot subsequently attack his conviction on
the ground that it was secured in violation of his constitutional
rights."'
The principle inquiry, then, when a party claims that preclu-
sion extends to a previously uncontested issue, should be whether
a court may reasonably assume that the allegedly precluded par-
ty's action in the first suit was an admission of the uncontested
issue. This, of course, would depend upon the circumstances of
the prior action and, ultimately, such objective factors as: (1) the
importance of the matter to the party; (2) the cost of the litiga-
tion; and (3) the ease with which the party could have presented a
defense to the uncontested point. A court should bar a litigant
from actually litigating an issue only if the court can reasonably
construe the litigant's action in the prior suit as a waiver of his
right to contest that issue.
Where, however, a party with incentive and opportunity to
litigate has failed to defend on an issue necessary for the judgment
in a prior action, it is reasonable for courts to construe that fail-
ure as an admission of the truthfulness of the matter, particularly
if the party has gone to the time and expense of defending on the
other points in issue. The efficient operation of our legal system
normally requires adjudication of fundamentally related issues in
a single proceeding in one court to avoid piecemeal, diffuse, and
unnecessarily prolonged litigation of controversies between par-
ties. Consequently, a litigant who has once foregone his opportu-
nity to contest a matter that was necessarily decided in a previous
proceeding should, at least, bear the burden of explaining his fail-
ure to controvert the matter in the earlier suit to justify litigation
of the matter in a second action.'
C. A Proposed Form for the Rule on Issue Preclusion
Unfortunately, the Restatement Second's basic rule on issue
preclusion is found not in a single provision but within three. Sec-
142 295 F. Supp. at 935 (citations omitted).
"4 See id. at 936. The supposedly precluded party may be able to show that there was an
explanation for the failure to litigate the issue in the first proceeding. See, e.g., Worcester v.
Commissioner, 370 F.2d 713, 717 (1st Cir. 1966). See also Plunkett v. Commissioner, 465
F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1972) (discussed at note 73 supra).
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tion 68 [section 27] presents the so-called "general rule" on issue
preclusion, but it is not really the general rule; it deals only with
subsequent actions between the same parties. Similarly, although
section 68.1 [section 28] purports to present the exceptions to this
rule, the exceptions deal only with subsequent litigation between
the same parties. Section 88 [section 29] then extends the rule of
sections 68 and 68.1 [sections 27 and 28] to litigation between the
party to be bound and others not parties in the first action. In-
stead of including a section comparable to section 68.1 [section
28] for litigation involving strangers to the first suit, the Restate-
ment Second includes the exceptions in section 88 [section 29]. So
the present format is: (1) the rule of issue preclusion between the
same parties, in section 68 [section 27]; (2) exceptions to this rule,
in section 68.1 [section 28]; (3) the rule of issue preclusion be-
tween a losing litigant and strangers, in section 88 [section 29];
and (4) exceptions to this rule, also in section 88 [section 29].
This format of rules in the Restatement Second results from a
decision to follow the numbering system of the first Restatement.
Because the first Restatement required mutuality of estoppel, sec-
tion 68 [section 27] applied only when two actions involved iden-
tical parties. The drafters adopted this format in the Restatement
Second even though they had abandoned the mutuality require-
ment. It was suggested that the Restatement Second combine issue
preclusion between the same parties and issue preclusion asserted
by nonparties to the first action in one section, but the glacier was
already in motion, and that logical combination never occurred.
However, courts do combine all of the factors in a single rule.
An acceptable rule on issue preclusion should require: (1)
that the party to be precluded have incentive and opportunity to
litigate; (2) that the issue be necessary to the judgment; and (3)
that the first court determined the issue against the party to be
precluded. The following proposal includes such a general issue
preclusion rule, which could be followed by exceptions such as
those found currently in sections 68.1 and 88 [sections 28 and
29]:
(a) When a party has had the incentive and opportunity to
litigate, a judgment against the party is preclusive on any issue
whose determination is necessary for the decision, except as
provided in (b).
(b) [Exceptions.]
Courts can obviously state a rule of this sort in a number of
different ways. The New York Court of Appeals adopted the fol-
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lowing formulation: "[W]here it can be fairly said that a party has
had a full opportunity to litigate a particular issue, he cannot
reasonably demand a second one." 144 The Seventh Circuit has set
forth the rule as follows: "Invocation of the doctrine of... issue
preclusion ... is proper when the party against whom the doc-
trine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
issue in the prior proceeding." 145  These latter two formulations
suffer because they do not include all of the necessary facets. The
rule must indicate that the determination of the issue was neces-
sary to the prior judgment. In the interest of comprehensiveness,
the rule should also indicate that the precluded party had the
incentive to litigate.' 4
The precise wording is not, however, the crucial matter. The
rule should specify the basis of preclusion (the incentive and
opportunity to litigate), the precluded party (the losing party in
the first proceeding), and the scope of the preclusion (issues
necessary for the decision rendered). Any rule including all of
these factors, regardless of form, will suffice.
II
PRECLUSION AND NONPARTIES TO FIRST ACTION
Under some circumstances, a litigant may find that a judg-
ment rendered in a prior action in which he was not a party may
affect his claim or a claim that someone else asserts against him.
Section 78 [section 34] of the Restatement Second states the general
rule under the topic "Parties and Persons Represented by Parties":
A person who is not a party to an action is not bound by or
entitled to the benefits of the rules of res judicata, except as
stated in §§ 73 and 74, §§ 79 to 88, and _.,147
The Reporter's Note states that "a non-party may be bound, for
example, where he is represented by a party or where his in-
144 Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 69, 246 N.E.2d 725, 728, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955,
958 (1969).
141 Speaker Sortation Sys., Div. of A-T-O, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 568 F.2d 46,
48 (7th Cir. 1978).
146 For a discussion of the reasons for keying the general rule of issue preclusion to the
existence of incentive and opportunity to litigate, see notes 17-30 and accompanying text
supra.
W4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 78 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975) [§ 34] [citing
final §§ 30, 31, 35-42, 52 & 29].
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terests are derivative from those of a person who was a party."
Supposedly, the precise rules are presented in the subsequent sec-
tions of this topic. 14
These Restatement Second provisions specifically cover partici-
pating nonparties (section 83 [section 39]), persons agreeing to be
bound either expressly or impliedly (section 84 [section 40]), per-
sons represented by a party (sections 85 and 86 [sections 41 and
42]), bailbr and bailee (section 87 [section 52]), successors to prop-
erty (section 89 [section 43]), transfer of property while action was
pending (section 90 [section 44]), survival action following per-
sonal injury action (section 92 [section 45]), wrongful death action
following personal injury action (section 92.1 [section 46]), bring-
ing both survival and wrongful death actions (section 92.2 [section
47]), derived actions (section 93 [section 48]), "Persons Having Re-
lationships in Which One is Vicariously Responsible for the Con-
duct of the Other" (section 99 [section 51]), actions by joint
obligee (section 102 [section 53]), assignor and assignee (section
104 [section 55]), parties to a contract and third-party beneficiary
(section 105 [section 56]), and effect of judgment against indem-
nitee on the indemnitor (sections 107 and 107.1 [sections 57
and 58]).
In addition to these specific situations, section 88 [section 29]
deals with the general problem of issue preclusion in subsequent
litigation involving the losing-precluded-party from the first
action. This section should really be a part of a general statement
about issue preclusion generally arising from losing on an issue in
a lawsuit. 49
These provisions do not appear to be flexible. The Restate-
ment Second includes no general language that courts can apply to
expand the concept of preclusion. Many courts will seek a
broadened application of preclusion to alleviate their overbur-
dened dockets. Indeed, the judicial movement toward expansion
has already begun. Green v. American Broadcasting Co.'50 is illustra-
tive. In the initial action, plaintiff sued for damages sustained as
the result of certain acts of defendant. After the court rendered
judgment for defendant, a group of plaintiffs commenced a
second action against defendant claiming that they had sustained
148 Sections 73 and 74 deal with jurisdiction to determine interest in things and jurisdic-
tion over status. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 73, 74 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973)
[§§ 30, 31].
149 See notes 143-46 and accompanying text supra.
1- 572 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1978).
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damages by the same acts. The Court of Appeals held that the
close relationship between the first plaintiff and the second group
of plaintiffs barred relitigation of the claim:
The basic principle in multiple party claim preclusion cases
seems to be that certain individuals may be so closely related,
their interests so interwoven, or their rights so similar that it is
unfair to treat them separately.... This principle is applicable
here. In a very real sense the investors here are [the second
group of plaintiffs]. Without the investors' $900,000 investment
the corporation would never have come into existence. The
Iowa court and others have found privity in situations similar
to here. 5 '
Towle v. Boeing Airplane Co.5 2 provides another example of judicial
treatment of claim preclusion against nonparties to the first suit.
The Court of Appeals observed,
Simply put, the transactions between [the defendant
corporation] and the plaintiffs may be viewed in two ways. The
plaintiffs may be considered as the promoters of Atlas entering
an agreement subsequently ratified by Atlas, or they may be
treated as a group of individuals who purchased the helicopter
(or invested in the corporation established for that purpose).
The choice of theories determines the technically proper
plaintiff, but the real parties in interest and the cause of action
are identical under both theories. The two causes of action
could only be pleaded in the alternative, as the amended com-
plaint did.
All matters now pressed were litigated in the earlier law-
suit and the plaintiffs are bound by that judgment as to the
amount of recoverable damages. Further action is barred by the
doctrine of res judicata, since the current plaintiffs were
obviously privies to Atlas with respect to this cause of action.
The defendant's motion for summary judgment must, there-
fore, be granted.55
In affirming the trial court's decision, the Court of Appeals
pointed out further that
'-' Id. at 631 (citations omitted).
'52 364 F.2d 590 (8th Cir. 1966).
"I Id. at 591-92 (citations omitted).
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The present appellants actively participated in the action result-
ing in the favorable judgment for the trustees and in so doing
are in no position to challenge the status of the corporation as
the real party in interest. The trial court found that appellants
were privies to the Atlas trustees with respect to the former
cause of action .... "Who are privies ordinarily presents a ques-
tion of fact requiring examination of the circumstances of each
case as it arises."
Here appellants were closely connected with Atlas as con-
trolling stockholders, directors and officers of Atlas. They have
wholly failed to demonstrate that the court's finding of privity
is clearly erroneous. '
The first Restatement of Judgments skirted this matter. Section
83 stated, "A person who is not a party but who is in privity with
the parties in an action terminating in a valid judgment is, to the
extent stated in [sections] 84-92, bound by and entitled to the ben-
efits of the rules of res judicata." 155 This rule appeared to cover
both claim and issue preclusion, and in fact an examination of
sections 84 through 92 shows that both are included, except that
section 90 deals only with issue preclusion (collateral estoppel).
But none of the rules spoke directly to the question of claim pre-
clusion arising against a nonparty to the first action in the situa-
tion considered here. None of the Restatement Second provisions
mentioned above addresses this problem; nor do any of them
have flexibility so that they could be viewed as applicable by im-
plication to this situation.'56
The Restatement Second does address the question of whether
a judgment gives rise to issue preclusion against a nonparty to the
first action. The Restatement Second indicates that courts may bind
a nonparty to a decision of an issue in the first action if (1) the
nonparty participated in the litigation; (2) the nonparty's interests
were adequately represented in the first action and the nonparty
has a specified relationship with a participant in the first action;
Id. at 593 (citations omitted).
"' RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 83 (1942).
156 The Reporter has indicated that "The sections in Chapter 4 dealing with substantive
connections are highly specific in the relationships to which they refer, although the
underlying theme is that the interest being represented in the second action was in some
sense represented in the original action." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, Introduc-
tion at 16-17 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980). This seems to be the problem. The specific rules
are so specific that there is no room for flexibility or a resort to their underlying theme.
See Vestal, Claim Preclusion and Parties in Privity: Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet in Perspective, 60
IowA L. R~v. 973 (1975).
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or (3) the nonparty has a certain legal relationship with the losing
party in the first action, or the nonparty has consented to be
bound.157
It is unfortunate that the Restatement Second does not have
some general statement about binding nonparties, to permit de-
velopment within its framework. The development will occur re-
gardless. Expansion of the use of a judgment against a nonparty,
rather than for the benefit of a nonparty, presents serious diffi-
culties. However, some courts have concluded that it is desirable
and possible to hold, in situations not covered by the Restatement
Second, a nonparty bound by a prior adjudication. 8
It is difficult to chart the probable future development of the
concept, but it would seem reasonable to predict:
(1) a willingness to expand issue preclusion against a non-
party to the first suit;
(2) a greater willingness to use such a judgment defensively
against a nonparty to the first suit than offensively; and
(3) expansion only within the constitutionally permissible
area, which means only a modest use of this type of preclusion.
Courts are beginning to recognize that expansion of the ap-
plication of issue preclusion to nonparties to the first suit,
although unorthodox, reaches a result that is both desirable and
constitutionally permissible. One court stated:
[I]n view of the great increase in the number of civil actions
commenced in the federal district courts in recent years, the
Court believes that the federal trial courts should not hesitate
to adopt new approaches designed to terminate needless and
futile litigation where identical liability issues have been fairly
and truly tried in a prior action.'59
This court, in a multi-district litigation, held that the decision
adverse to the claimants in the lead case was preclusive as far as
the remaining plaintiffs were concerned. Other courts in the fu-
ture may hold that logic, fair play, and judicial efficiency require
such a result. The precedents exist;'6° the Constitution does not
1" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 83-85 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975) [§§ 39-41];
Id. § 89, 93 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976) [§§ 43, 48].
'" See Vestal, Res JudicatalPreclusion: Expansion, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 357, 362-373 (1974)
and cases cited therein.
1'9 In re Air Crash Disaster Near Dayton, Ohio, 350 F. Supp. 757, 768 (S.D. Ohio 1972),
rev'd sub. nom. Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1973).
160 See, e.g., Vestal, supra note 158; Note, Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties, 87 HARV. L.
REv. 1485 (1974).
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forbid such a result if there has been adequate representation of
the interest of the person to be bound in the first action.161 Only
time will tell whether courts will adopt a broader application of
issue preclusion.
Another cloud on the horizon is the possibility that courts will
preclude a nonparty on an issue because the nonparty knew of
the litigation and had the opportunity to intervene to present his
point of view but elected not to. This is consistent with the idea
that one should be bound if he had the full opportunity to litigate
and chose not to. Courts have not fully developed this concept
but have given it some serious consideration.'62 In Provident
Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson,61 the Supreme Court
touched upon this matter:
[I]t might be argued that Dutcher should be bound by the pre-
vious decision because, although technically a nonparty, he had
purposely bypassed an adequate opportunity to intervene. We
do not now decide whether such an argument would be correct
under the circumstances of this case. If, however, Dutcher is
properly foreclosed by his failure to intervene in the present
litigation, then the joinder issue ... vanishes, for any rights of
Dutcher's have been lost by his own inaction.'"
This is not the only time the Supreme Court has suggested this
possibility. Earlier that same year, the Court in the Penn-Central
Merger and N & W Inclusion Cases6' held that certain parties in
161 See U.S. CONsr. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
112 On the question of the effect on possible preclusion of a right to intervene, the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88(3) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975) [§ 29] might allow
relitigation of an issue if "[t]he person seeking to invoke favorable preclusion, or to avoid
unfavorable preclusion, could have effected joinder in the first action between himself and
his present adversary." This is quite different from the effect being urged in the test, that
is, that preclusion might arise because a nonparty had the opportunity to intervene.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 111 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977) [§ 62] bars a non-
party from asserting a claim arising out of the transaction "that was the subject of the
action" if there might be inconsistent obligations imposed on a party to the first action and
the claimant in the second action misled the party against whom the second action is
brought so that he did not employ certain procedures "that could have determined the
claimant's claim." This might be used against a nonparty who was invited to intervene,
refused, and thus misled a party to the lawsuit as to the interest of the nonparty invitee.
'" 390 U.S. 102 (1968).
Id. at 114. The Court referred again to this idea by stating "when Dutcher raises this
defense he may lose, either on the merits of the permission issue or on the ground that the
issue is foreclosed by Dutcher's failure to intervene in the present case .. " Id. at 115.
16 389 U.S. 486 (1968).
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other suits "might have joined in the New York proceedings," 166
and noted,
The process of the New York court ran throughout the
Nation.... In addition, the United States waived possible objec-
tions on venue grounds to appearances by any party in the
New York litigation. In these circumstances, it would be sense-
less to permit parties seeking to challenge the merger and the
inclusion orders to bring numerous suits in many different dis-
trict courts .... 167
In holding that the instant decision barred any further attacks on
the approval of the merger and the inclusion of three protected
lines, the Court specifically stated that the Borough of Moosic
would be barred although it had not joined in the New York ac-
tion. Apparently the Court took this action deliberately. As Justice
Douglas noted in his partial dissent:
The Court seemingly declares, however, a new rule of res
judicata in its effort to prevent the parties in Pennsylvania from
proceeding with their actions challenging the basic valdity of
the Commission's ... order.... Because the Borough of
Moosic, which had properly filed a suit in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania but saw its action stayed, refused to accept the
invitation of the New York District Court (a court in which
Moosic was never a party, and which neither assumed jurisdic-
tion over Moosic nor attempted to do so by making it an in-
voluntary plaintiff) to come to New York and litigate, the Court
holds that Moosic is bound by the decision of the New York
court in the Inclusion Case. The New York court itself did not
attempt to hold that its orders in the Inclusion Case would bind
Moosic if it did not join in the New York proceedings. And I
am at a loss to discover any such principle in the law of res
judicata.
A party is entitled to its day in court; and I cannot fathom
how a party can be deprived of that right or waive it by refus-
ing an invitation-not even an order-to litigate in another
court located in another State. The Court could reach its con-
clusion under the doctrine of res judicata only if Moosic could
be termed in "privity" with one of the parties litigating in the
New York action.
6
'1 Id. at 505.
167 Id. n.4.
161 Id. at 541-42.
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Justice Douglas concluded that the requisite privity did not
exist. 69
The Penn-Central Merger case illustrates the Court's willing-
ness to expand the law of issue preclusion, and highlights the fail-
ure of the Restatement Second to include a provision that will
accommodate such growth. Lower courts have begun to follow the
Supreme Court's lead, and have held that litigants who had the
right to intervene in the first action but failed to do so are pre-
cluded by the first court's judgment. In Defenders of Wildlife v.
Andrus,'70 the court stated, "A party that fails to intervene when he
is clearly able to do so may be bound by a judgment in a case he
could have entered as a matter of right." 171 The District Court
for the Southern District of Florida took that same position as one
ground for its decision in Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified
Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel. 72 That court stated, "Since
the Division of Archives had the opportunity but failed to inter-
vene, instead relying on the United States to further its interests,
it should now be bound by the judgment rendered previously
against the United States." 173 Despite contrary authority,7 4 these
cases open the door to the possibility that preclusion may arise
from the unexercised right to intervene.75
Courts today have indicated a willingness to experiment with
the concepts of preclusion. Just as Judge Traynor and the Califor-
nia court almost forty years ago took a giant step in Bernhard v.
Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association,7 6 courts today
seem willing to challenge the extant outer limits of preclusion. For
example, in In re Air Crash Near Dayton, Ohio,'77 the court held a
nonparty plaintiff bound by a prior adjudication because of his
close relationship with the defeated plaintiff in the first action. On
appeal, however, the Sixth Circuit reversed.'78 A trial court in
169 Id. at 547-48.
170 77 F.R.D. 448 (D.D.C. 1978).
171 Id. at 452.
172 459 F. Supp. 507 (S.D. Fla. 1978), aff'd, 621 F.2d 1340 (5th Cir. 1980).
'7 Id. at 516.
174 See, e.g., Show-World Center, Inc. v. Walsh, 438 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (citing
cases from 1943 and 1918).
171 Prate v. Freedman, 430 F. Supp. 1373 (W.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 573 F.2d 1294 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 922 (1978).
176 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
,7' 350 F. Supp. 757 (S.D. Ohio 1972), rev'd sub. nom. Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666
(6th Cir. 1973).
178 Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1973).
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Oregon '79 held a nonparty bound by a decision against the plain-
tiff in the first action. The court emphasized that the plaintiff in
the second action had testified in the first; the same attorney had
been involved in the two actions; and the two complaints con-
tained identical allegations of wrongdoing. The intermediate
appellate court, however, reversed the innovative court, stating
"There is much respectable authority for defendants' contention.
The law in this state, however, does not extend as far as defen-
dants would wish it to, and it is not within our authority to ex-
pand upon it." 110
Turner v. American Bar Association ,8' represents an expansion
of claim preclusion that has gained the approval of at least two
courts of appeals. In Turner, the court rejected the claim of a
right to lay representation in that litigation and held that, in the
future, the matter need not be decided by any federal court-
even if the litigants were not those involved in the instant cases
and even though the judge was named as a defendant. This case
is an extension of issue preclusion. The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals has acknowledged the existence of "isolated de-
cisions of lower federal courts advancing bold new rules for pre-
clusion of nonparties, which have been hailed by commentators as
a sign of things to come." 182 Regrettably, the Restatement Second
will not easily accommodate such advances. Restatements should
be flexible enough to allow changes in the future; they should not
be dead hands from the past, hindering case-by-case development
that is the hallmark of the common law.
III
ISSUE PRECLUSION IN CRIMINAL CASES
Section 133 [section 85] of the Restatement Second deals with
the effect of a criminal judgment in a subsequent civil action in-
volving either the government or a third person.' It is com-
"' Rynearson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 43 Or. App. 9'43, 607 P.2d 738 (1979).
180 Id. at 947, 607 P.2d at 740.
... 407 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Tex., W.D. Pa., N.D. Ind., D. Minn., S.D. Ala., W.D. Wis.
1975) (mem.), aff'd, 539 F.2d 715 (7th Cir., 1976), aff'd, 542 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1976).
lu Consumers Union v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 590 F.2d 1209, 1217 n.38 (D.C.
Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union, 100 S. Ct. 1194 (1980).
"s' Although the rules of the Restatement Second are generally straightforward, at least
one blackletter provision is confusing. Section 133(3) states,
A judgment against the prosecuting authority is preclusive against the govern-
ment:
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pletely reasonable for courts to hold for preclusion arising from
criminal prosecutions, and they have indicated a willingness to do
so. But the cases have not limited the preclusive effect of a cri-
minal proceeding to subsequent civil litigation; courts are now
holding for issue preclusion in a subsequent criminal
prosecution. 1 4  The Comment to section 133 [section 85] notes,
When the two proceedings in question are both criminal
prosecutions, a judgment in the first prosecution may have pre-
clusive effects as to issues determined and as to offenses ad-
judicated, such as lesser included offenses. It may also have
preclusive effects through operation of the rule against placing
an accused twice in jeopardy. 5
Having whetted the reader's appetite, the Reporter continues
that this matter is "beyond the scope of this Restatement." This is
unfortunate. 8" The Restatement Second is the logical work in
which to examine preclusion between criminal prosecutions.
There is not another Restatement waiting in the wings to under-
take this examination and we have a long wait for the Restatement
(Third) of Judgments.
(a) In a subsequent civil action between the government and the defen-
dant in the criminal prosecution, as stated in § 68 [§ 27] with the exceptions
stated in § 68.1 [§ 28];
(b) In a subsequent civil action between the government and another per-
son, as stated in § 88 [§ 29].
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 133(3) (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980) [§ 85]. This deals
with the situation where the defendant is found not guilty of tax evasion. The government
may then elect to sue the defendant for taxes not paid. Superficially, this section would
seem to be saying that the acquittal on the income tax evasion charge would be preclusive
in the civil action. Of course, this is not true because of the difference in the standard of
proof required. The acquittal simply meant that the state was not able to prove the defen-
dant's evasion beyond a reasonable doubt. In the civil action, the proof standard is the
preponderance of evidence standard. In fact, that is the thrust of the rule in § 133 [§ 85]
because of the incorproation of § 68.1 [§ 28], more specifically § 68.1(d) [§ 28]. The same
thing is true concerning § 133(3)(b) [§ 85] beause of the incorporation of § 88 [§ 29] which
includes § 68.1 [§ 28].
'1 See Vestal, Issue Preclusion and Criminal Prosecutions, 65 IOWA L. REv. 281 (1980); Ves-
tal, Criminal Proseecutions: Issue Preclusion and Full Faith and Credit, 28 KAN. L. REv. I
(1979).
185 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 133, Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980)
[§ 85].
186 Whether there is, or is developing, in the criminal law a concept similar to claim
preclusion is not clear. However, there are indications of a trend toward restricting multi-
ple prosecutions for the same event. For example, many states have restrictions on a state
prosecution for an act after a federal prosecution for that act has taken place. See, e.g., 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 111 (Purdon 1973 & Supp. 1980). This same conclusion has been
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The Institute, in omitting discussion of criminal case issue
preclusion, has missed a great opportunity to examine a develop-
ing area of the law and give the bench and bar the benefit of a
careful analysis. The general topic of issue preclusion in criminal
cases encompasses a number of interesting problems, and it is re-
grettable that we do not have the benefit of the thinking of the
Reporter, the advisors, and the Institute on some of these prob-
lems.
Standefer v. United States,"5 7 a recent Supreme Court case, illus-
trates the complex nature of issue preclusion in criminal prosecu-
tions. In Standefer, the government charged a party with aiding
and abetting a government agent in accepting unlawful com-
pensation. The agent had been tried and acquitted of the charges
of which the present defendant was charged with aiding and abet-
ting. The instant defendant urged issue preclusion against the
government flowing from the first prosecution. Chief Justice Bur-
ger, writing for a unanimous Court, rejected the claim of issue
preclusion. He distinguished the criminal case from civil cases for
the purpose of issue preclusion, and indicated that the govern-
ment might not have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the matter. He examined procedural differences and the possible
differences in the use of evidence. He recognized that courts
might be able to resolve these problems on a case by case ex-
amination of the applicable factual situations, but he rejected this
approach as too time consuming. He also found a fundamental
difference between the actions, reasoning that criminal proceed-
ings involve "competing policy considerations," and concluded
that the enforcement of criminal laws outweighs the "economy
concerns that undergird the estoppel doctrine." 188 He quoted
with approval the court of appeals, stating:
The public interest in the accuracy and justice of criminal re-
sults is greater than the concern for judicial economy professed
reached at the state level by construction of state constitutional language. See People v.
Cooper, 247 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. 1976). The federal government, in the Petite policy, has
announced that it normally will not prosecute an individual for an act after a state prosecu-
tion for the act. Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22 (1977). At the state level, there is
authority for the proposition that multiple prosecutions for a single event will not be per-
mitted even though several victims were involved. State v. Gregory, 66 N.J. 510, 333 A.2d
257 (1975). Although the picture is not clear, these pieces suggest that a broad mosaic may
be forming which will have great significance in criminal prosecutions in the future. It is
noteworthy that this is occurring because of judicial decisions, legislative acts, and executive
policies and not necessarily because of the requirements of the United States Constitution.
"17 100 S. Ct. 1999 (1980).
"' Id. at 2008.
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in civil cases and we are thus inclined to reject, at least as a
general matter, a rule that would spread the effect of an
erroneous acquittal to all those who participated in a particular
criminal transaction.' 89
This decision leaves some room for movement for any court fac-
ing a related problem in the future. Moreover, the Supreme
Court is not the final word with respect to state court proceed-
ings. A state court might decide to apply issue preclusion in a case
similar to Standefer. Should it do so, the prosecuting authority
could not obtain effective Supreme Court review of the acquittal
in the state court.1 90
CONCLUSION
The Restatement Second is an excellent product overall, but-
perhaps inevitably-is subject to criticism. An examination of its
positions, the relevant cases, and the principles underlying issue
preclusion suggests future cases, and not the Restatement, will de-
cide what course the law takes.
Restating the law in a particular field can be very beneficial.
It reveals a cross-section of the law at a particular time; it reports
the state of the law in a particular time frame. Unfortunately, it
does not allow for a disclosure of the trends in the law. A Restate-
ment lacks a time dimension, a dimension which is extremely im-
portant precisely because the law is a growing, dynamic force.
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments suffers to a very marked de-
gree from this deficiency because the law of judgments is develop-
ing rapidly; courts are quickly accepting new concepts and dis-
carding old limitations.
This Article has identified three areas in which the Restate-
ment Second suffers some deficiencies. The articulation of issue
preclusion is a troublesome matter upon which the Restatement
Second will not have the last word. The scope of application of
both claim and issue preclusion to nonparties to the initial action
is expanding so rapidly that the Restatement Second could not deal
adequately with the topic. It is unfortunate that the Institute did
not recognize the difficult job it was undertaking and provide in
the Restatement Second some room for growth. Finally, it is
regrettable-but perhaps understandable-that the Reporter and
189 Id.
' The Court in the Standefer case noted that the prosecution "can not secure appellate
review where a defendant has been acquitted." Id. at 2007.
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the advisors did not complete the job by examining and synthesiz-
ing the law of preclusion in succeeding criminal prosecutions. The
Institute could have helped immensely in this area.
